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Abstract
In the knapsack problem a group of agents want to ll a knapsack with several
goods. Two issues should be considered. Firstly, to decide optimally the goods
selected for the knapsack, which has been studied in many papers. Secondly, to
divide the total revenue among the agents, which has been studied in few papers
(including this one). We assign to each knapsack problem several cooperative games.
For some of them we prove that the core is non-empty. Later, we follow the axiomatic
approach. We propose two rules. The rst one is based on the optimal solution of the
knapsack problem. The second one is the Shapley value of the so called optimistic
game. We o¤er axiomatic characterizations of both rules.
Keywords: Knapsack problem; axiomatic; cooperative games.
1 Introduction
A mountaineer is planning a mountain tour with a knapsack, which has a limited size.
Thus, he must decide what objects to carry in the backpack. The idea is to select the most
important things, given its limited size. This is a classical example of the so called knapsack
problem. In general we have a nite set of goods which has to be packed in a knapsack
of limited size. Each good j has a prot pj and a size wj: We should select a subset of
goods whose total size does not exceed the size of the knapsack and whose total prot is a
maximum.
Arribillaga acknowledges 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The knapsack problem has been applied to various real-world decisions. Examples (see
Pisinger and Toth (1998)) include investments (deciding how to split the investment of a
xed amount of money between several business projects) and cargo airlines (deciding how
to ll an airplane given the demand of the customers). Other applications (see Bretthauer
and Setty (2002)) include nancial models, production and inventory management, strati-
ed sampling, the optimal design of queuing network models in manufacturing, computer
systems, and health care.
The most popular formulation is the so called 0-1 knapsack problem. There is a nite
number of goods (one unit of each good) and it must be decided which ones are selected
for the knapsack. The goods can either enter completely (1) or not at all (0). Since the
number of goods is nite, there is an optimal solution (the one that maximizes the sum
of the prots of the goods included in the knapsack). The rst issue addressed is the
computational complexity of the optimal solution. Unfortunately, this problem is NP hard
(see, for instance, Martello et al (2000)). Thus, the optimal solution must be approximated
by some algorithms.
There are more general formulations of the knapsack problem. They include the con-
tinuous knapsack problem, where fractions of each good can be included; the bounded
knapsack problem, where there can be several copies of each good; the d-dimensional knap-
sack problem, where there are several constraints (for instance weight and volume) on lling
the knapsack; the multiple knapsack problem, where there are several knapsacks instead of
only one; the multiple choice knapsack problem, where there are several types of object and
one object of each type must be chosen; and the non-linear knapsack problem, where the
objective function and the constraint are non-linear. Again, the main issue addressed by
this literature is how to compute the optimal solution. Pisinger and Toth (1998), Martello
et al (2000), and Kellerer et al (2004) survey this literature.
In all the literature mentioned above it is assumed that there is a single agent involved
in the situation. Of course, such agent only cares about what is the optimal solution.
Nevertheless in many situations several agents could be involved. As in the classic situation
we have a knapsack of limited size which has to be fullled with several goods of a given
size. But now agents could have di¤erent preferences over the importance of the goods. We
assume that a group of agents (N) decide which goods (from a set M) should be included
in a knapsack of xed size W . Each good j 2 M has a xed size wj. The preferences of
the agents for the goods are heterogeneous and are modeled by a vector p where for each
i 2 N and j 2 M , pij 2 R+ denotes the utility obtained by agent i when one unit of good
j is included in the knapsack1. We are assuming implicitly that the goods are some kind
of public goods because every agent could benet from them. We also allow for the case of
private goods. If we take pij > 0 for agent i and p
k
j = 0 when k 6= i; then good j could be
considered as a private good of agent i:
Now we can dene the prot of good j (the pj of the classical problem) as
P
i2N
pij. We also
assume (as in the classical model) that agents will select the goods maximizing the total
utility. Thus, the computation of the optimal solution (or the approximation obtained) is
1We assume that the utility of each agent is linear in in the quantities consumed.
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the rst part of the problem. The second part is to divide the cost (or benets) among
the agents. The rst part is mainly studied in operations research literature, while the
second part is also studied in economics. For instance, in the minimum cost spanning tree
problem, Bird (1976), Kar (2002), Dutta and Kar (2004), Tijs et al (2006), Bergantiños
and Vidal-Puga (2007a), Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2010), and Trudeau (2012) propose
several rules for allocating the cost of the optimal solution among the agents. Hougaard
and Moulin (2018) study how to allocate the cost of risky projects. Borm et al (2001) give
a survey focusing on connection problems, routing (Chinese postman and travelling sales-
man), scheduling (sequencing, permutation, assignment), production (linear production,
ow), and inventory.
As far as we know, the paper by Darmann and Klamler (2014) is the only one in which
this second part is studied in the knapsack problem. They focus on the continuous knapsack
problem, where the optimal solution could be computed in polynomial time. They consider
the following: "the goal is to divide the cost of the optimally packed knapsack among the
individuals in a fair manner. In this paper, we assume that every unit of weight imposes
a cost of one, and therefore the total cost of the knapsack is equal to the weight constraint
W". They then dene a family of rules which is characterized by several properties. They
also study a particular rule in such family, that divides the cost associated with each good
equally among the agents approving that good.
Our paper also considers the second part of the problem, but our approach is di¤erent.
Darmann and Klamler (2014) consider the case where agents either approve or disapprove
of each good. Namely, for each i and j, pij = 1 when agent i approves good j and p
i
j = 0
when agent i disapproves good j. Moreover, our main goal is to divide the total utility
generated by the optimal knapsack among the agents.
We rst clarify the di¤erence between the two approaches with a trivial example. Con-
sider the knapsack problem with three agents (1, 2, and 3) and two goods (a and b). The size
of the knapsack is 1 and the size of each good is also 1. Good a is approved by agents 1 and
2 and good b is approved by agent 3. In our model p1a = p
2
a = p
3
b = 1 and p
1
b = p
2
b = p
3
a = 0:
Including good a in the knapsack results in an aggregate utility of 2 (agents 1 and 2 enjoys
an utility of 1 and agent 3 enjoys 0). Including good b results in an aggregate utility of
1 (agent 1 and 2 enjoys an utility of 0 and agent 3 enjoys 1). The optimal solution is to
include good a in the knapsack. In Darmann and Klamler (2014) agents 1 and 2 pay 0.5 and
agent 3 pays nothing. This means that agent 1 and 2 obtain some earnings (the utility that
they get from good a minus the amount that they pay) whereas agent 3 obtains nothing
(he receives nothing and pays nothing). In our case agents must decide how to divide the
utility generated by the optimal solution (2 in this case) among the agents. Thus, we also
consider the possibility that agent 3 is compensated by agents 1 and 2 (because good b is
not included) and thus obtains a prot. Actually, one of the allocations that we consider
does this.
In this paper we follow a cooperative approach and study how to divide the total utility
among the agents. Thus, we implicitly assume that agents who include many of "their
goods" in the knapsack could compensate those agents who include few of "their goods" in
order to obtain a more fair allocation.
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In the literature there is a way of associating a cooperative game with each knapsack
problem (see, for instance, Kellerer et al (2004)). The value of a coalition S is dened as
the utility obtained by agents of that coalition when the knapsack is lled in the worst
way for S. We call this game the pessimistic game. It is known that the core of this game
is non-empty and contains the allocation induced by the optimal solution. We introduce
two alternative cooperative games: the optimistic game and the realistic game. In the
optimistic game the value of a coalition S is dened as the utility obtained by the agents
of that coalition when the knapsack is lled in the best way for S. It is easy to see that the
core of the optimistic game could be empty. In the realistic game the value of a coalition
S is dened as the utility obtained by agents of that coalition when agents in NnS ll the
knapsack in the best way for NnS. We prove that the realistic game has a non-empty core
containing the allocation induced by the optimal solution.
We then follow the axiomatic approach: a knapsack rule is a function that for each
knapsack problem selects the goods to be included in the knapsack and the way in which
the total utility generated by those goods is divided among the agents. We introduce
several properties of rules and we discuss some relationships between the properties. One
of them is core selection, which says that the allocation should be in the core of the realistic
game. In several knapsack problems core selection implies that some agents could receive
0, which seems a little unfair. Thus, we also consider the securement property (inspired
by Moreno-Ternero and Villar (2004)), which guarantees all agents a minimum amount.
Securement says that each agent must receive at least (1=n) the amount that he obtains
when the knapsack is assigned to him. Unfortunately there is no rule that satises both
properties. Thus we consider two rules: one satisfying each of the properties.
We rst consider the rule induced by the optimal solution. This rule allocates to each
agent the utility obtained by that agent under the optimal solution. It satises core selection
but fails securement. We present three characterizations of this rule. In the rst one we use
core selection and no advantageous splitting. In the second one we use e¢ ciency, maximum
aspirations, independence of irrelevant goods, and composition up. In the third one we use
e¢ ciency, maximum aspirations, and no advantageous splitting.
We then consider the Shapley value of the optimistic game, which satises securement
but fails core selection. We characterize it with e¢ ciency and equal contributions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we formally introduce the
knapsack problem. In Section 3 we study the three cooperative games associated with the
knapsack problem. In Section 4 we introduce the properties, the rules, and the axiomatic
characterizations. In Section 5 we present some concluding remarks. In the Appendix we
present some omitted proofs of our results. Finally, we give the list of references.
2 The knapsack problem
In the knapsack problem a set of agents (N) want to include some goods (M) in a knapsack
of size W:
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We assume that the set of potential agents is innite. Then, there exists an innite set
N such that N  N :
We focus on the continuous knapsack problem, where it is assumed that goods are
perfectly divisible. Then we can select fractions of each good to be included in the knapsack.
A knapsack problem is dened as a 5-tuple P = (N;M;W;w; p) where
 N = f1; :::; ng denotes a set of agents.
 M = fg1; :::; gmg denotes the set of goods.
 W 2 R+ is the size of the knapsack.
 w = fwjgj2M where for each j 2M; wj denotes the size of good j:
 p = pij	i2N;j2M where for each i 2 N; j 2M; pij 2 R+ denotes the utility that agent
i obtains for each unit of good j that is included in the knapsack.
Darmann and Klamler (2014) consider the particular case where pij 2 f0; 1g for each
i 2 N; j 2M: Namely, agents approve or disapprove each good.
We introduce some notation used later.
For each j 2M;
pj =
X
i2N
pij (1)
is a measure of the importance of good j for the set of agents.
Besides, for each S  N and j 2M; pSj =
X
i2S
pij: Notice that for each j 2M; pNj = pj:
The interesting case arises when we can not include in the knapsack all goods, namely,
W <
X
j2M
wj: The case W 
X
j2M
wj is solved easily by including all goods in the knapsack.
We assume in the rest of the paper that W <
X
j2M
wj:
We say that x = (xj)j2M 2 RM is a feasible solution for P if xj 2 [0; 1] for each j 2M
and
X
j2M
wjxj = W . We denote by FS (P ) the set of feasible solutions for P: As xj 2 [0; 1];
we assume that one unit of each good is at most admitted. Since W <
X
j2M
wj; FS (P ) has
many elements.
Each feasible solution x induces a vector of utilities u (x) = (ui (x))i2N given by the
goods we have included in the knapsack. For each feasible solution x and each i 2 N;
ui (x) =
X
j2M
pijxj:
5
The rst question addressed in the literature (mainly from Operations Research) is to
select the goods to be included in the knapsack in such a way that the aggregated utility
of the agents is maximized. Formally,
max
x2FS(P )
X
i2N
ui (x) : (2)
In what follows, we assume, without loss of generality, that the goods are sorted in such
a way that2
p1
w1
 :::  pm
wm
:
This problem has at least one optimal solution. One of them is x (P ) =

xj (P )
	
j2M
dened as
xj (P ) :=
8>>><>>>:
1 if j = 1; :::; s  1
1
ws
 
W  
s 1X
k=1
wk
!
if j = s
0 if j = s+ 1; :::;m
(3)
where s is dened by
s 1X
k=1
wk < W 
sX
k=1
wk:
When no confusion arises we write x instead of x (P ) : We will denote by X(P ) (or
X) the set of all optimal solutions in P:
If we assume that p1
w1
> ::: > pm
wm
; we can guarantee that the previous problem has a
unique optimal solution.
We denote by P the class of all knapsack problems and by P the class of knapsack
problems where p1
w1
> ::: > pm
wm
.
We assume that agents choose the goods to be included in the knapsack. They also
decide the way in which the total utility generated by the selected goods is divided among
them.
For any problem P the set of feasible allocations is dened as
FA (P ) =
(
(yi)i2N 2 RN+ :
X
i2N
yi =
X
i2N
ui (x) for some x 2 FS (P )
)
:
2This ordering of the goods is not necessarily unique because ties are possible.
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3 Knapsack cooperative games
In this section we associate with each knapsack problem three cooperative games with
transferable utility known as pessimistic, optimistic, and realistic, depending on how the
value of a coalition S is dened.
The pessimistic game has been already studied in the literature (see, for instance,
Kellerer et al: (2004)) and the value of a coalition S is computed in the worst scenario
for coalition S: This is the most standard approach and has been used in many di¤erent
kind of problems. In this case it is assumed that the knapsack is fullled including the
goods with less aggregated utility for agents in S: The optimistic game, inspired in Bergan-
tiños and Vidal-Puga (2007b) and Bergantiños and Lorenzo (2008), is in some sense dual
of the pessimistic game because the value of a coalition S is computed in the best scenario
for coalition S: Thus, it is assumed that the knapsack is fullled including the goods with
more aggregated utility for agents in S: The realistic game tries to be a kind of compromise
between the pessimistic and the optimistic game. We take a pessimistic approach in the
sense that we allow coalition NnS to fulll the knapsack in the best way for them. We
take an optimistic approach in the sense that, among all the allocations that give a larger
aggregated utility to NnS; coalition S can select the one that gives a larger aggregated
utility to S:
We study the core of such games. The core of pessimistic and realistic games is always
non-empty whereas the core of the optimistic game could be empty.
A cooperative game with transferable utility (briey, a TU game) is a pair (N; v)
where v : 2N ! R satises v (?) = 0: When no confusion arises we write v instead of
(N; v) :
The core of a TU game (N; v) is dened as
c (v) =
(
x 2 RN :
X
i2N
xi = v (N) and for each S  N;
X
i2S
xi  v (S)
)
:
In the pessimistic approach we assume that the knapsack is lled in the worst way for
any proper coalition S  N and all agents agree to ll the knapsack optimally. Formally,
for each knapsack problem P we dene the pessimistic game (N; vpP ) where,
vpP (S) =
8><>:
minx2FS(P )
P
i2S ui (x) if S  N
max
x2FS(P )
X
i2N
ui (x) if S = N
9>=>; :
When no confusion arises we write vp instead of vpP :
In the optimistic approach we assume that agents in S can ll the knapsack however
they want. Formally, for each knapsack problem P we dene the optimistic games (N; voP )
where for each S  N;
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voP (S) = max
x2FS(P )
X
i2S
ui (x) :
When no confusion arises we write vo instead of voP :
The next notation is necessary in order to dene the realistic approach. Given S  N;
let P S denote the knapsack problem induced by P when the set of agents is S. Namely
P S =

S;M;W;w;

pij
	
i2S;j2M

.
In the realistic approach we assume that coalition S chooses its best allocation among
those that optimize the space of the knapsack for the coalition NnS. Let X(PNnS) be the
set of optimal solutions of the problem PNnS. For each knapsack problem P we dene the
realistic game (N; vrP ) where for each S  N;
vrP (S) = max
x2X(PNnS)
X
i2S
ui (x) :
When no confusion arises we write vr instead of vrP :
Remark 1 It is obvious that for each problem P and each S  N; vp(S)  vr(S)  vo(S)
and vp(N) = vr(N) = vo(N). Then,
c(N; vo)  c(N; vr)  c(N; vp):
Example 1 Let P be such that N = f1; 2; 3g, M = fa; b; cg, W = 2 and wj = 1 for all
j 2M: Besides the vector p satises the following conditions.
 Agent 1 is interested in good a but not in the others. Namely, p1a > 0 and p1j = 0
otherwise.
 Agents 2 and 3 prefer b to c and they are not interested in good a: Furthermore,
they prefer good c more than agent 1 prefers good a: Namely, for each agent i 6= 1,
pib > p
i
c > p
1
a and p
i
a = 0:
 Agent 2 is more interested in objects of Mn fag than agent 3. Namely, p2j > p3j ; for
each j 2 fb; cg :
We now compute the three games. We detail the computation for coalition f2; 3g. The
worst feasible solution for agents 2 and 3 is to include goods a and c: Thus, vp (2; 3) = p2c+p
3
c :
The best feasible solutions for agent 1 are fag ; fa; bg ; and fa; cg : Among them, agents 2
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and 3 prefer fa; bg. Then, vr (2; 3) = p2b + p3b : The best feasible solution for agents 2 and 3
is to select goods b and c: Then, vo (2; 3) = p2b + p
3
b + p
2
c + p
3
c :
T vp (T ) vr (T ) vo (T )
f1g 0 0 p1a
f2g p2c p2b + p2c p2b + p2c
f3g p3c p3b + p3c p3b + p3c
f1; 2g p1a + p2c p2b + p2c p2b + p2c
f1; 3g p1a + p3c p3b + p3c p3b + p3c
f2; 3g p2c + p3c p2b + p3b p2b + p3b + p2c + p3c
N p2b + p
3
b + p
2
c + p
3
c p
2
b + p
3
b + p
2
c + p
3
c p
2
b + p
3
b + p
2
c + p
3
c
As vo (f1g) + vo (f2g) + vo (f3g) > vo (N) ; then c (vo) = ?:
The core of the pessimistic game vp is non empty and contains u (x) for all x 2 X
(see, for instance, Kellerer et al: (2004)).
The core of the optimistic game vo could be empty as Example 1 shows.
We now prove that the core of the realistic game vr is non-empty because u (x) belongs
to such core.
Theorem 1 For each knapsack problem P; u (x0) 2 c (vr) for all x0 2 X:
Proof. Let P be a problem: Assume, to obtain a contradiction, that there exists x0 2 X
such that u (x0) =2 c(vr): Then, it exists S  N such that
vr(S) >
X
j2M
pSj x
0
j
:
Let x 2 X(PNnS) be such that
vr(S) =
X
j2M
pSj xj
As x 2 X(PNnS);
X
j2M
p
NnS
j xj 
X
j2M
p
NnS
j x
0
j: Then,
X
i2N
ui (x) =
X
i2N
X
j2M
pijxj =
X
j2M
pSj xj +
X
j2M
p
NnS
j xj >
X
j2M
pSj x
0
j +
X
j2M
p
NnS
j x
0
j
=
X
j2M
pjx
0
j =
X
i2N
ui (x
0) ;
which contradicts that x0 2 X.
The next example shows that the core of vr could have other elements besides those
that are induced for the optimal solutions. (i.e. elements outside of fu (x0) : x0 2 X).
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Example 2 Let P be such that N = f1; 2; 3g; M = fa; b; c; dg, W = 5, wa = wb = wd = 2,
wc = 1; p
1
d = 0:7; p
1
a = p
1
b = p
1
c = 0, p
2
a = p
2
b = 1; p
2
c = p
2
d = 0, p
3
a = 1; p
3
b = 0:9, p
3
c = 0:8;
and p3d = 0: Then, pa = 2; pb = 1:9; pc = 0:8, pd = 0:7;
pa
wa
=
2
2
>
pb
wb
=
1:9
2
>
pc
wc
=
0:8
1
>
pd
wd
=
0:7
2
:
The optimal solution is x = (1; 1; 1; 0) : Namely, we include in the knapsack a; b and c:
Now u (x) = (0; 2; 2:7) :
vr (1) = 0; vr (2) = 2; vr (3) = 1:9; vr (1; 2) = 2; vr (1; 3) = 2:7; vr (2; 3) = 3:45;
and vr (N) = 4:7: Then vr has many core elements di¤erent from u (x) : For instance,
(0:7; 2; 2) :
4 Knapsack rules and properties
In this section we introduce several properties of rules. We discuss some relationships
between the properties. Core selection says that we must select an allocation in the realistic
core. Rules selecting allocations in the core could be unfair because agents who want goods
which are not in great demand (those with small pj
wj
) could receive zero. Thus, we consider
the property of securement, which says that each agent must receive a minimum amount.
Unfortunately there is no rule that satises both properties.
We then introduce two rules. The rst one, based on the optimal solution, satises core
selection. The second one, based on the Shapley value, satises securement. We study the
properties satised by each rule. We also provide several axiomatic characterizations of
both rules.
A rule is a function  assigning to each problem P a pair  (P ) = (g (P ) ; f (P )) where
g (P ) 2 FS (P ) and P
i2N
fi (P ) =
X
i2N
ui (g (P )) : Notice that g (P ) denote the goods we
include in the knapsack and f (P ) denotes the way in which the total utility generated by
g (P ) is divided among the agents.
We now introduce several properties of rules and we discuss some relationships between
the properties.
E¢ ciency says that f (P ) is not Pareto dominated in the set of feasible allocations
FA (P ).
E¢ ciency (ef). For each problem P;
P
i2N
fi (P ) = max
x2FS(P )
X
i2N
ui (x) :
In P e¢ ciency says that g (P ) 2 X. In P e¢ ciency means that g (P ) = x:
Symmetry says that if two agents give the same utility to each good, then both receive
the same allocation.
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Symmetry (sym). For each problem P and each i; i0 2 N such that pi = pi0 ; then
fi(P ) = fi0(P ):
If the valuation of agent i to some goods increases, then the allocation to agent i can
not decrease.
Monotonicity (mon). Consider two problems P = (N;M;W;w; p) and P 0 = (N;M;W;w; p0)
such that there exists i 2 N satisfying p0ij  pij for all j 2 M and p0kj = pkj for all j 2 M
and k 2 Nn fig : Then, fi (P 0)  fi (P ) :
Dummy says that if some agent is not interested in any good, then he receives nothing.
Dummy (dum). For each problem P and each i 2 N such that pij = 0 for each j 2M;
then fi(P ) = 0:
Core selection says that the allocation proposed by the rule should belong to the core
of the problem. Because of the denitions, we think that vr (S) represents better what
agents of S could obtain by themselves than vp (S) or vo (S) : Thus, we select the core of
the realistic game for dening this property.
Core selection (cs). For each problem P; f (P ) 2 c (vr) :
It is clear that core selection implies e¢ ciency, because a feasible allocation, f (P ) ; in
the core satises that,
P
i2N fi (P )  vr (N) :
Assume that we remove a good not selected by the optimal solution, then the allocation
proposed by the rule does not change. This property is inspired in the well known principle
of independence of irrelevant alternatives (used, for instance, in bargaining problems by
Nash (1950)).
Independence of irrelevant goods (iig). Let P be a problem and j 2M satisfying
that xj = 0 for any optimal solution x: Then,  (P ) = 
 
PMnfjg

:
Composition up says that we can fulll the knapsack in one step or, rst fulll some
part of the knapsack and later the remaining. This property has been used in several eco-
nomics problems. See for instance the surveys of Thomson (2003, 2015) about bankruptcy
problems. Darmann and Klamler (2014) also use this property.
For each problem P = (N;M;W;w; p) ; W1  W and x 2 [0; 1]M we dene the problems
P (W1) = (N;M;W1; w; p) and
P (W  W1; x) = (N;Mx;W  W1; wx ; px)
where
Mx = fj 2M : xj < 1g ;
(wx)j = wj (1  xj) for each j 2Mx; and
(px)
i
j = p
i
j for each i 2 N and j 2Mx:
Composition up (cu). For each problem P and each W1  W ,
gj (P ) = gj (P (W1)) + gj (P (W  W1; g (P (W1)))) for all j 2M and
fi (P ) = fi (P (W1)) + fi (P (W  W1; g (P (W1)))) for all i 2 N:
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We now introduce two properties closely related. There are actually several papers in
which these two properties appear as a single property. No advantageous merging means
that no group of agents has incentives to pool their utility and to present themselves as a
single agent. No advantageous splitting means that no agent has incentives to divide his
utility and to present himself as a group of agents.
Let P = (N;M;W;w; p) and P 0 = (N 0;M;W;w; p0) be such that N  N 0 and there
exists i 2 N with pi = p0i + P
k2N 0nN
p0k and pk = p0k for all k 2 Nn fig :
No advantageous merging (nam). Then,
fi (P
0) +
X
k2N 0nN
fk (P
0)  fi (P ) :
No advantageous splitting (nas). Then,
fi (P
0) +
X
k2N 0nN
fk (P
0)  fi (P ) :
Darmann and Klamler (2014) consider the property of pairwise merge-and-split-proofness,
which is related in its motivation with nam and nas. Both properties are inspired by the
property of strategy-proofness introduced in ONeill (1982). Actually we dene it in the
same way as shown in Thomson (2003, 2015). There are two di¤erences between pairwise
merge-and-split-proofness and nam + nas. First, when one agent is divided into several
(or several join together as a single agent), in Darmann and Klamler (2014) each agent
must approve di¤erent goods. Since our model is more general we allow di¤erent agents to
approve the same good. Second, in Darmann and Klamler (2014) the property says that
agents who do not merge or split should not be a¤ected. In our case (as in the bankruptcy
problem) we say that agents that merge or split are not better o¤.
The idea of the following property is to set an upper bound on the amount received by
each agent. In our case, each agent can receive no more than the amount that he receives
when he can use the whole knapsack.
For each problem P and each i 2 N we dene the maximum aspiration of agent i as
MAi (P ) = max
x2FS(P )
ui (x) : Notice that MAi (P ) = vo (i) :
Maximum aspirations (ma) : For each problem P and each i 2 N; fi (P ) MAi (P ) :
The idea of the following property is the dual of the previous one. We try to guarantee
each agent a minimum amount. In our case each agent must receive at least (1=n) the
utility that he obtains when the knapsack is assigned to him. This property is related to
a property called fair share that has been used, for instance, in the fair division problem.
Following Moreno-Ternero and Villar (2004) we call it securement, as they do for the case
of bankruptcy problems.
12
For each problem P and each i 2 N we dene the secure allocation of agent i as
SEi (P ) =
1
n
max
x2FS(P )
ui (x) :
Notice that SEi (P ) =
vo(i)
n
:
Securement (se) : For each problem P and each i 2 N; fi (P )  SEi (P ) :
Equal contributions is a principle widely used in the literature since Myerson (1980)
introduced it in TU games. It says that if agent i leaves the problem, the change in the
allocation of agent k coincides with the change in the allocation to agent i when agent k
leaves the problem.
Equal contributions (ec). For each problem P and each i; k 2 N;
fi (P )  fi
 
PNnfkg

= fk (P )  fk
 
PNnfig

:
All the above properties can be considered as desirable for a rule, but clearly there could
be incompatibilities between them. For example, if we restrict our attention to rules satisfy-
ing core selection (securement) we must leave aside securement (core selection) because the
two properties are incompatible. We also prove that under dummy and e¢ ciency proper-
ties, independence of irrelevant goods and securement are incompatible. In the proposition
below we study these relationships between the properties.
Proposition 1 (1) There is no rule satisfying core selection and securement.
(2) Let  be a rule satisfying dummy and e¢ ciency. Then,  does not satisfy indepen-
dence of irrelevant goods and securement.
Proof. (1) Assume that  = (g; f) is a rule that satises cs: Consider Example 1. For each
i 2 Nn f1g ; vr (i) = P
j2M
pijx

j = ui (x
) because xNnfig = x = (0; 1; 1) : Now,
vr (N) =
X
i2N
ui (x
) =
X
i2Nnf1g
X
j2M
pijx

j =
X
i2Nnf1g
vr (i) :
Then, c (vr) = (ui (x))i2N : Since  satises cs; f1 (P ) = u1 (x
) = 0: But f1 (P ) = 0 <
SE1 (P ) =
p1a
3
. Then,  does not satisfy se.
(2) Let P be such that N = f1; 2g ; M = fa; bg ; W = 1; wa = wb = 1; p1a = 1; p2b = 0:9
and p1b = p
2
a = 0: Now v
o (1) = 1; vo (2) = 0:9; and vo (1; 2) = 1. Then, SE1 (P ) = 0:5,
SE2 (P ) = 0:45 and x = (1; 0) : If  satises dum; f2
 
P fag

= 0: Now, assume that 
satises ef; then g(P ) = x: Then, if  satises iig; f2 (P ) = f2
 
P fag

= 0 (since that
gb(P ) = 0): Then, as f2 (P ) = 0 < 0:45 = SE2 (P ) ;  does not satisfy se.
Core selection is a quite standard property in the literature. It would be nice for an
allocation to be in the core. Nevertheless, allocations in the core could be very unfair. In
the knapsack problem this could also happen: For instance, in Example 1 there is only one
13
core allocation, which gives 0 to agent 1. Thus, if we try to nd a fair allocation sometimes
it is better to look outside the core. For instance, in TU games the Shapley value, the most
popular fair allocation, could be outside the core.
We think that securement is a nice fairness property because it guarantees that all non-
dummy agents receive something. For instance, in Example 1 it says that agent 1 receives
something.
By Proposition 1 core selection and securement are incompatible. Since we consider
both properties to be interesting, we study two rules in the paper: One satisfying core
selection and the other satisfying securement.
4.1 The rule induced by the optimal solution
In this section we study a rule that satises core selection. We focus on the rule induced by
the optimal solution to the knapsack problem. We ll the knapsack in the optimal way and
each agent receives the utility given by the knapsack, i:e: there are no transfers between
agents. A general knapsack problem can have several optimal solutions, so we restrict our
study to P; where the optimal solution is unique and then well dened. Notice that the
Lebesgue measure of PnP in P is zero. We study the properties satised by this rule and
we give several axiomatic characterizations.
Given P 2 P, let x denote the unique optimal solution of P . Making an abuse of
notation we denote the rule induced by x also as x: Namely, let x be the rule dened as
g (P ) = x and fi (P ) = ui (x) for all i 2 N:
The optimal solution has been used by Darmann and Klamler (2014) for dening a rule.
The cost associated with each good, selected by the optimal solution, is divided equally
among the agents approving such good.
We now study the properties of rule x:
Proposition 2 (1) The rule x satises e¢ ciency, symmetry, monotonicity, dummy, core
selection, independence of irrelevant goods, composition up, no advantageous merging, no
advantageous splitting, and maximum aspirations.
(2) The rule x does not satisfy securement and equal contributions.
The proof is in Appendix.
In the next theorem we give several axiomatic characterizations of the optimal rule.
Theorem 2 (1) x is the unique rule satisfying core selection and no advantageous split-
ting.
(2) x is the unique rule satisfying e¢ ciency, independence of irrelevant goods, compo-
sition up, and maximum aspirations.
(3) x is the unique rule satisfying e¢ ciency, no advantageous splitting, and maximum
aspirations.
Besides, the properties used in the previous characterizations are independent.
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The proof is in Appendix.
Remark 2 If we check the proof of (1) in Theorem 2 we realize that we can replace core
selection by e¢ ciency and individual rationality (for each problem P; each agent i 2 N
must receives at least vrP (i)):
4.2 The rule induced by the Shapley value
In this section we study a rule satisfying securement. We ll the knapsack in the optimal
way and each agent receives the utility given by the Shapley value of the optimistic game
associated with the knapsack problem3. In this section we consider the set of all problems
P :We study the properties satised by this rule and we give an axiomatic characterization.
The Shapley value of a game (N; v) (Shapley, 1953) is denoted by Sh (v) : For each
i 2 N we have that
Shi (v) =
X
SNnfig
s! (n  s  1)!
n!
(v (S [ fig)  v (S)) :
Given P 2 P, let x denote an optimal solution of P . We dene the optimistic
Shapley rule, denoted by Sho; as the rule indued by the Shapley value of the optimistic
game. Namely, Sho1 (P ) = x and Sho2 (P ) = Sh (voP ) :
We now study the properties satised by the optimistic Shapley rule.
Proposition 3 (1) The optimistic Shapley rule satises e¢ ciency, symmetry, monotonic-
ity, dummy, maximum aspirations, securement, and equal contributions.
(2) The optimistic Shapley rule does not satisfy core selection, independence of irrelevant
goods, composition up, no advantageous merging and no advantageous splitting.
The proof is in Appendix.
We now give a characterization of Sho:
Theorem 3 The optimistic Shapley rule is the unique rule satisfying e¢ ciency and equal
contributions.
Besides, the properties are independent.
The proof is in Appendix.
3There are other papers where the it is studied the Shapley value of the optimisitic game. For instance
Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2007b) study it in minimum cost spanning tree problems.
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5 Final Remarks
We summarize the main ndings of the paper and we conclude.
In the classical knapsack problem a single agent want to ll a knapsack with several
goods. Thus, such agent has to decide optimally the goods selected for the knapsack. This
problem has been studied in many papers of the Operations Research literature.
We consider the case with several agents with linear and heterogeneous preferences over
the goods. Now two issues should be considered. Firstly, as in the single agent case, we
select the goods that maximize the aggregated utility of all agents. Secondly, we divide the
aggregated utility generated by the selected knapsack among the agents. As far as we know
the second issue has been studied in very few papers (including this one).
We assign to each knapsack problem three cooperative games. The pessimistic game
has been already studied in the literature. The optimistic and the realistic game has been
introduced in this paper. The pessimistic and the realistic have a non-empty core but the
optimistic could have an empty core.
We also consider two rules. The rst one is based on the optimal solution of the knapsack
problem. The second one is the Shapley value of the optimistic game. We o¤er axiomatic
characterizations of both rules. The main advantage of the rst one is that it is always in
the core of the realistic and the pessimistic game. The main disadvantage is that it could
be rather unfair and some agents could get nothing. The rule based in the Shapley value is
not so unfair because it guarantees to each agent a minimal utility. The main disadvantage
is that it could be outside of the core.
Since few papers have been studied this problem there are many things that could be
considered. We give a brief list.
In this paper we have studied the Shapley value of the optimistic value. What happens
with the Shapley value of the pessimistic and the realistic game?
Instead of studying the Shapley value, we can consider the nucleolus of some of the
games.
We have associated to each knapsack problem a cooperative game. What happens if
we associate a bankruptcy problem. The classical bankruptcy rules produce interesting
allocations in this setting?
6 Appendix: Proofs of the results
Proof of Proposition 2. (1) It is obvious that x satises ef; sym; dum; iig; and ma:
We now prove that x satises cu:We know that there exists s 2 N such that x1j (P ) = 1
for all j < s; 0 < x1s (P )  1; and x1j (P ) = 0 for all j > s: Let P and W1  W: Then,
it exists t  s such that x1j (P (W1)) = 1 for all j < t; 0 < x1t (P (W1))  1; and
x1j (P (W1)) = 0 for all j > t:
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Assume that x1t (P (W1)) < 1 and t < s (the other cases are similar and we omit it).
Then Mx1(P (W1)) = ft; :::;mg ;
 
wx1(P (W1))

t
< wt,
 
wx1(P (W1))

j
= wj for all j > t; and
the values of p and px1(P (W1)) coincide. Thus, 
px1(P (W1))

t 
wx1(P (W1))

t
=
pt 
wx1(P (W1))

t
>
pt
wt
>
pt 1
wt 1
=
 
px1(P (W1))

t 1 
wx1(P (W1))

t 1
>
> ::: >
pm
wm
=
 
px1(P (W1))

m 
wx1(P (W1))

m
:
Now it is obvious that
x1t
 
P
 
W  W1; x1 (P (W1))

= wt  
 
wx1(P (W1))

t
and
x1j
 
P
 
W  W1; x1 (P (W1))

= x1j (P (W1)) for all j > t:
Then,
x1j (P ) = x
1
j (P (W1)) + x
1
j
 
P
 
W  W1; x1 (P (W1))

for all j 2M .
Because of the previous expression and the denition of f it is obvious that
x2i (P ) = x
2
i (P (W1)) + x
2
i
 
P
 
W  W1; x1 (P (W1))

for all i 2 N:
Then x satises cu:
By Proposition 1, x satises core selection.
Let P and P 0 be as in the denition of nam and nas: Since pj = p0j for all j 2 M;
x1(P ) = x1(P 0); and
x2i (P
0) +
P
k2N 0nN
x2k (P
0) =
P
j2M
p0ij x
1
j (P
0) +
P
j2M
P
k2N 0nN
p0kj x
1
j (P
0)
=
P
j2M
P
k2N 0nN
(p0ij + p
0k
j )x
1
j (P
0)
=
P
j2M
pijx
1
j (P )
= x2i (P );
we deduce that x satises nam and nas:
(2) Let P be such that N = f1; 2g ; M = fa; bg ; W = 1; wa = wb = 1; p1a = 1; p2b = 0:9
and p1b = p
2
a = 0: Now v
o (1) = 1; vo (2) = 0:9; and vo (1; 2) = 1. Thus, x1 (P ) = (1; 0) ;
x2 (P ) = (x21 (P ); x
2
1 (P )) = (1; 0) ; SE2 (P ) = 0:45; x
  P f1g = 1; and x  P f2g = 0:9:
Thus, x does not satisfy se and ec:
Proof of Theorem 2. (1) By Proposition 2, x satises both properties.
We now prove the uniqueness. Let  = (g; f) be a rule satisfying cs and nas:
Given a problem P; we know that there exists s 2 N such that x1j (P ) = 1 for all j < s;
0 < x1s (P )  1; and x1j (P ) = 0 for all j > s and
p1
w1
> ::: >
ps
ws
>
ps+1
ws+1
:::
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Let i be in N: We can nd hi 2 N large enough such that
(1  1
hi
)pi1 +
P
k2N : k 6=i
pk1
w1
> ::: >
(1  1
hi
)pis +
P
k2N : k 6=i
pks
ws
>
(1  1
hi
)pis+1 +
P
k2N : k 6=i
pks+1
ws+1
:::
(4)
Let N  N 0 such that jN 0nN j = hi   1: We consider P 0 = (N 0;M;W;w; p0) such that
p0i = p
i
hi
; p0k = p
i
hi
for all k 2 N 0nN and p0k = pk for all k 2 Nnfig: By nas;
fi (P )  fi (P 0) +
X
k2N 0nN
fk (P
0) : (5)
Furthermore, by (4),
vrP 0(i) =
ui (x
(P ))
hi
and vrP 0(k) =
ui (x
(P ))
hi
for all k 2 N 0nN:
By cs;
fi (P
0)  u1 (x
(P ))
hi
and fk (P 0)  u1 (x
(P ))
hi
for all k 2 N 0nN:
By (5),
fi (P )  ui (x(P )) : (6)
As (6) holds for all i 2 N; by ef;
fi (P ) = ui (x
(P )) for all i 2 N:
(2) By Proposition 2, x satises the four properties.
We now prove the uniqueness. Let  = (g; f) be a rule satisfying the four properties.
Since  satises ef , g (P ) = x:
Let s be such that gj (P ) = 1 for all j < s; 0 < gs (P )  1; and gj (P ) = 0 for all j > s:
We take W1 = w1: By cu;
gj (P ) = gj (P (w1)) + gj (P (W   w1; g (P (w1)))) for all j 2M and
fi (P ) = fi (P (w1)) + fi (P (W   w1; g (P (w1)))) for all i 2 N:
By ef;
gj (P (w1)) =

1 if j = 1
0 otherwise
By iig
 (P (w1)) = 

P (w1)
f1g

:
For each i 2 N , MAi

P (w1)
f1g

= pi1: By ma fi

P (w1)
f1g

 pi1 for each i 2 N: By
ef ,
P
i2N
fi

P (w1)
f1g

=
P
i2N
pi1: Thus,
fi (P (w1)) = fi

P (w1)
f1g

= pi1 for each i 2 N:
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We now apply cu to problem P (W   w1; g (P (w1))) by takingW1 = w2: Let us make an
abuse of notation and denote by P (w2) the rst problem given by cu and by P (W   w1   w2)
the second one. Using arguments similar to those used for P (w1) we can deduce that
gj (P (w2)) =

1 if j = 2
0 otherwise
fi (P (w2)) = p
i
2 for each i 2 N:
If we continue to apply cu we obtain that
gj (P ) =
s 1X
j=1
gj (P (wj)) + gj
 
P
 
W  
s 1X
j=1
wj
!!
for all j 2M and
fi (P ) =
s 1X
j=1
fi (P (wj)) + fi
 
P
 
W  
s 1X
j=1
wj
!!
for all i 2 N;
where for each j = 1; :::; s  1;
gj0 (P (wj)) =

1 if j0 = j
0 otherwise
fi (P (wj)) = p
i
j for each i 2 N:
and
gj
 
P
 
W  
s 1X
j=1
wj
!!
=

x1s (P ) if j = s
0 otherwise
fi
 
P
 
W  
s 1X
j=1
wj
!!
= pisgs (P ) for each i 2 N:
Thus, g (P ) = x and for each i 2 N;
fi (P ) =
s 1X
j=1
fi (P (wj)) + fi
 
P
 
W  
s 1X
j=1
wj
!!
=
s 1X
j=1
pij + p
i
sgs (P ) =
s 1X
j=1
pijx
1
j (P ) + p
i
sx
1
s (P )
= ui (x
) :
(3) By Proposition 2, x satises the properties.
We now prove the uniqueness by induction on n; the number of agents. Let  = (g; f)
be a rule satisfying ef; ma and nas:
When n = 1; by ef; g (P ) = x and f1 (P ) = u1 (x) :
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We assume that N = f1; 2g: Given a problem P; let s be as in the denition of the
optimal solution x given by 3. Since P 2 P;
p11 + p
2
1
w1
> ::: >
p1s + p
2
s
ws
>
p1s+1 + p
2
s+1
ws+1
:::
Now, let d1 2 N such that
p11 + (1  1d1 )p21
w1
> ::: >
p1s + (1  1d1 )p2s
ws
>
p1s+1 + (1  1d1 )p2s+1
ws+1
::: (7)
Let N  N 0 be such that jN 0nN j = d1 1:We consider P 0 = (N 0;M;W;w; p0) such that
p01 = p1; p02 = p
2
d1
and p0k = p
2
d1
for all k 2 N 0nN: By nas;
f2 (P
0) +
X
k2N 0nN
fk (P
0)  f2 (P ) : (8)
By ef;
f1 (P )  f1 (P 0) : (9)
Now, let P 00 = (N 00;M;W;w; p00) such that N 00 = f1; 2g and p001 = p01 + P
k2N 0nN
p0k and
p002 = p02 = p
2
di
:
Notice that P 0 is obtained from P 00 when agent 2 in P 00 split in agents f2g [ (N 0nN) :
By nas;
f1 (P
0) +
X
k2N 0nN
fk (P
0)  f1 (P 00) : (10)
By (7),
MA1(P
00) = u1 (x(P 00)) :
By ma;
f1 (P
00) MA1(P 00) = u1 (x(P 00))
=
P
j2M
p001j x

j(P
00)
=
P
j2M
p1jx

j(P
00) +
P
j2M
P
k2N 0nN
p0kxj(P
00)
=
P
j2M
p1jx

j(P
0) +
P
j2M
P
k2N 0nN
p0kxj(P
0)
= u1 (x
(P 0)) +
P
k2N 0nN
uk (x
(P 0)) :
(11)
By (10) and (11),
f1 (P
0) +
X
k2N 0nN
fk (P
0)  u1 (x(P 0)) +
X
k2N 0nN
uk (x
(P 0)) : (12)
By (12) and ef ,
f2 (P
0)  u2 (x(P 0)) : (13)
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Similarly, if we take k 2 N 0nN and consider P 000 = (N 000;M;W;w; p000) such that N 00 =
f1; kg and p0001 = p01 + p02 + P
k2N 0n(N[fkg)
p0k and p000k = p02 = p
2
di
; it can be proved that
fk (P
0)  uk (x(P 0)) : (14)
Then,
fk (P
0)  uk (x(P 0)) for all k 2 N 0nN: (15)
By (12) and (15),
f1 (P
0)  u1 (x(P 0)) : (16)
By (9) and since x (P ) = x (P 0) and p1 = p01;
f1 (P )  u1 (x(P )) :
Similarly it can be proved that
f2 (P )  u2 (x(P )) :
By ef;
fi (P ) = ui (x
(P )) for all i 2 N:
We now consider the case n  3: Assume that the result is true when we have less than
n agents and we prove it for n:
We rst prove that for any P 2 P and any pair of agents i; k 2 N (i 6= k)
fi (P ) + fk (P )  ui (x(P )) + uk (x(P )) : (17)
We dene P+ = (N+;M;W;w; p+) such that N+ = Nnfkg and p+i = pi + pk and
p+t = pt for all t 2 N+n fig : By induction hypothesis
ft
 
P+

= ut
 
x(P+)

for all t 2 N+: (18)
By nas;
fi (P ) + fk (P )  fi
 
P+

: (19)
By (18) and (19)
fi (P ) + fk (P )  ui
 
x(P+)

= ui (x
(P )) + uk (x(P )) : (20)
Fix i 2 N; by (17)P
k2Nnfig
[fi (P ) + fk (P )] 
P
k2Nnfig
[ui (x
(P )) + uk (x(P ))],
(n  1)fi (P ) +
P
k2Nnfig
fk (P )  (n  1)ui (x(P )) +
P
k2Nnfig
uk (x
(P )),
(n  2)fi (P ) +
P
k2N
fk (P )  (n  2)ui (x(P )) +
P
k2N
uk (x
(P )) :
(21)
21
By ef and since n  3;
fi (P )  ui (x(P )) : (22)
Since (22) holds for all i 2 N and ef;
fi (P ) = ui (x
(P )) :
We now prove that the properties used in the previous characterization are independent.
(1) Let P be the problem in Example (2). Let  =
 
g; f 

be such that g (P ) = x
for each problem P . Besides, f  (P ) = x2(P ) if P 6= P and f    P = (0:7; 2; 2) : This rule
satises cs; but fails nas:
Let  = (g; f) be such that g (P ) = x for each problem P: Besides, the total utility
given by each good j is divided among the agents proportionally to the utility that each
agent gives to the goods in x:Namely, given i 2 N and j 2M we dene:
yij =
P
xk>0
pikP
i2N
P
xk>0
pik
pjx

j
fi (P ) =
X
j2M
yij:
This rules satises nas but fails cs:
(2) Let f 0 be the rule that selects no good and allocates 0 to each agent. This rule
satises ma; iig and cu but fails ef:
Let  = (g; f) be such that g (P ) = x for each problem P: Besides, the total utility
given by each good is divided equally among the agents given positive utility to such good.
Namely, given i 2 N and j 2M we dene:
Nj =

i 2 N : pij > 0
	
:
yij =
 1
jNj jpjx

j if i 2 Nj
0 otherwise
fi (P ) =
X
j2M
yij:
This rule satises ef; iig and cu but fails ma:
Let  =
 
g; f

be such that g (P ) = x for each problem P: Besides, the total utility
is divided as equal as possible among the agents in such a way that no agent gets more
than his maximum aspiration. Namely, given a problem P and i 2 N;
fi (P ) = min fMAi (P ) ; g where
X
i2N
fi (P ) =
X
i2N
ui (x
) 4:
4Notice that f is dened as the constrained equal awards rule where the estate is the total utility of
x and the claims are the maximum aspirations.
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This rule satises ef; ma; and cu but fails iig:
Let f = (g; f) be such that g (P ) = x for each problem P: Given i 2 N and j 2M
we dene:
M =

j 2M : xj > 0
	
;
FS (P ) =
(
x :
X
j2M
wjxj = W and xj = 0 if j =2M
)
yi = max
x2FS(P )
ui (x)
Now, suppose that N = fi1; :::ing such that yi1  yi2 :::  yin : Notice that ui (x)  yi 
MAi (P ) for all i 2 N: We dene
fi1 (P ) = minfyi1j ;
X
i2N
ui (x
)g:
fi2 (P ) = minfyi2j ;
X
i2N
ui (x
)  fi1 (P )g:
...
fih (P ) = minfyihj ;
X
i2N
ui (x
) 
h 1X
r=1
fir (P )g:
...
fin (P ) =
X
i2N
ui (x
) 
n 1X
r=1
fir (P ) :
This rule satises ef; ma; and iig but fails cu:
(3) 0 satises ma and nas but fails ef:
 satises ef and ma but fails nas:
 satises ef and nas but fails ma:
Proof of Proposition 3. (1) It is obvious that Sho satises ef:
sym: Assume that agents i and j are symmetric in P: Thus, they are symmetric in the
optimistic game vo: Since the Shapley value satises symmetry, both agents receive the
same. Thus Sho satises sym:
mon. Let P , P 0 and i as in the denition of mon: Since the Shapley value is an average
of marginal contributions, it is enough to prove that for each S  Nn fig ; we have that
voP (S [ fig)  voP (S)  voP 0 (S [ fig)  voP 0 (S) :
Since voP 0 (S) = v
o
P (S) it is enough to prove that v
o
P (S [ fig)  voP 0 (S [ fig) : Notice
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that FS (P ) = FS (P 0) : Let y 2 FS (P ) be such that voP (S [ fig) =
P
k2S[fig
P
j2M
pkjyj: Now,
voP (S [ fig) =
X
k2S[fig
X
j2M
pkjyj 
X
k2S[fig
X
j2M
p0kj yj
 max
x2FS(P 0)
X
k2S[fig
X
j2M
p0kj xj = v
o
P 0(S [ fig):
dum: Assume that agent i is a dummy in P: Thus, agent i is a dummy in the optimistic
game vo: Since the Shapley value satises dummy, agent i receives nothing. Thus Sho
satises dum:
ma: Since the Shapley value is an average of marginal contributions, it is enough to prove
that for each problem P; each i 2 N; and each S  Nn fig we have that voP (S [ fig)  
voP (S) MAi (P ) :
Let y; y0 2 FS (P ) be such that voP (S[fig) =
P
k2S[fig
P
j2M
pkjyj and v
o
P (S) =
P
k2S
P
j2M
pkjy
0
j:
Now,
voP (S [ fig)  voP (S) =
X
k2S[fig
X
j2M
pkjyj  
X
k2S
X
j2M
pkjy
0
j
=
X
j2M
pijyj +
X
k2S
X
j2M
pkjyj  
X
k2S
X
j2M
pkjy
0
j
By denition of y0;
P
k2S
P
j2M
pkjyj  
P
k2S
P
j2M
pkjy
0
j  0: Then,
voP (S [ fig)  voP (S) 
X
j2M
pijyj  max
x2FS(P )
X
j2M
pijxj =MAi (P ) :
se: Let P be a problem and i 2 N: Since vo (i) = SEi (P )n and vo (S [ i)  vo (S) we
have that Sho2i (P )  SEi (P ) :
ec: Let P be a problem and i; k 2 N: Let (N; voP ) be the corresponding optimistic game.
Myerson (1980) proved that the Shapley value satises equal contributions in TU games.
Then,
Shi (N; v
o
P )  Shi (Nn fkg ; voP ) = Shk (N; voP )  Shk (Nn fig ; voP ) :
Since Sho2i (P ) = Shi (N; v
o
P ) and Sh
o2
k (P ) = Shk (N; v
o
P ) ; it is enough to prove that
Sho2i
 
PNnfkg

= Shi (Nn fkg ; voP ) and Sho2k
 
PNnfig

= Shk (Nn fig ; voP ) : We prove that
Sho2i
 
PNnfkg

= Shi (Nn fkg ; voP ) (the other case is similar and we omit it). Since Sho2i
 
PNnfkg

=
Shi
 
Nn fkg ; vo
PNnfkg

, it is enough to prove that for each T  Nn fkg ; voP (T ) = voPNnfkg (T ) :
Notice that,
FS (P ) =
(
x :
X
j2M
wjxj  W and xj 2 [0; 1]8 j 2M
)
= FS
 
PNnfkg

:
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Then,
voP (T ) = max
x2FS(P )
X
i2T
ui (x) = max
x2FS(PNnfkg)
X
i2T
ui (x) = v
o
PNnfkg(S):
(2) It is obvious that Sho does not satisfy iig:
Consider Example 1: Since vo (1) = p1a and v
o (S [ 1) = vo (S) when ? 6= S  Nn f1g ;
we have that Sho21 (P ) = Sh1 (v
o) = 1
3
p1a: We take W1 = 2: Since
voP (W1) (1) = v
o
P (W W1;Sho1(P (W1))) (1) = p
1
a;
voP (W1) (S [ f1g) = voP (W1) (S) and
voP (W W1;Sho1(P (W1))) (S [ f1g) = voP (W W1;Sho1(P (W1))) (S) when ? 6= S  Nn f1g ;
we have that
Sh1

voP (W W1;Sho1(P (W1)))

= Sh1
 
voP (W1)

=
1
3
p1a:
Since,
Sho21 (P (W1)) + Sh
o2
1
 
P
 
W  W1; Sho1 (P (W1))

=
2
3
p1a;
we deduce that Sho does not satises cu:
Since Sho satises se and Proposition 1, we have that Sho does not satisfy cs:
nas: It follows from Theorem 2 (3) and the fact that the Sho satises ef and ma:
nam: Let P be such that N = f1; 2; 3g, M = fa; b; cg, W = 1 and wj = 1 for all j 2M:
Besides the vector p satises the following conditions: p1a =
1
2
; p1b = 0; p
1
c = 1; p
2
a = 1;
p2b = 1, p
2
c = 0; p
3
a =
3
4
; p3b = 1 and p
3
c = 1: Thus,
T voP (T )
f1g 1
f2g 1
f3g 1
f1; 2g 3
2
f1; 3g 2
f2; 3g 2
N 9
4
Then, Sho2 (P ) = Sh (voP ) =
 
2
3
; 2
3
; 11
12

: Therefore, Sho21 (P ) + Sh
o2
2 (P ) =
4
3
:
Assume that agents 1 and 2 merge in agent 1. Now N+ = f1; 3g, p+1 = p1 + p2; and
p+3 = p3: Then,
T voP+ (T )
f1g 3
2
f3g 1
N+ 9
4
Then Sho2 (P+) = Sh
 
voP+

=
 
11
8
; 7
8

:Then,
Sho21 (P ) + Sh
o2
2 (P ) =
4
3
<
11
8
= Sho21
 
P+

;
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which implies Sho does not satisfy nam:
Proof of Theorem 3. By Proposition 3 we know that Sho satises ef and ec:
We now prove the uniqueness. This proof is quite standard in the literature. Let  be
a rule satisfying ef and ec: We prove it by induction on n:
When n = 1; by ef; g (P ) = x and f1 (P ) = u1 (x) : Assume that the result is true
when we have less than n agents and we prove it for n: By ec; for all i 2 Nn f1g ;
fi (P )  fi
 
PNnf1g

= f1 (P )  f1
 
PNnfig
)
fi (P )  f1 (P ) = fi
 
PNnf1g
  f1  PNnfig)X
i2Nnf1g
fi (P )  (n  1) f1 (P ) =
X
i2Nnf1g
 
fi
 
PNnf1g
  f1  PNnfig)X
i2N
fi (P )  nf1 (P ) =
X
i2Nnf1g
 
fi
 
PNnf1g
  f1  PNnfig :
Since  satises ef;
P
i2N
fi (P ) =
P
i2N
ui (x
) :
By induction hypothesis,
P
i2Nnf1g
 
fi
 
PNnf1g
  f1  PNnfig is known. Then,
f1 (P ) =
P
i2N
ui (x
)  P
i2Nnf1g
 
fi
 
PNnf1g
  f1  PNnfig
n
:
Thus, f1 (P ) is uniquely determined. Let i 2 Nn f1g : By ec;
fi (P ) = fi
 
PNnf1g

+ f1 (P )  f1
 
PNnfig

;
which means that fi (P ) is uniquely determined.
We now prove that the properties are independent.
0; dened as in the proof of Theorem 2, satises ec but fails ef:
, dened as in the proof of Theorem 2, satises ef but fails ec:
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